What can the widespread prevalence of violence teach us about the relationship between cities and development?
The pervasiveness of violence is evident globally, but its abundance is most deeply felt in urban environments in the global south (Moser & Mcllwaine, 2014, 333). As Eduardo Moncada has affirmed ‘Africa and Latin America are […] among the most violent regions in the world, with homicide rates over twice as high as the global average’ (Moncada, 2013, 218). By analysing this violence, not just in its physical form but also its structural and infrastructural manifestations, it can teach us about key facets of the relationship between cities and development (Jones and Rodgers, 2015, 18). In this essay I understand this relationship as being about the social, economic and political processes that shape the way in which inhabitants experience their cities in the global south. With this in mind, I will begin by arguing that as violence can be said to be rooted in ‘socio-economic marginalisation’, its existence alone is revealing of the inherent inequality that characterises this relationship (Jones & Rodgers, 2015, 17). Building on this, I will make the case that development processes currently prioritise the interests of a select few. I will validate this by looking at instances of ‘infrastructural violence’ in cities such as Managua and Cape Town (Jones & Rodgers, 2015, 17). I also argue that a discussion of violence in urban environments can help illuminate who some of the key actors influencing development are. I suggest that, in the growing absence of the state, these are the private sector and informal actors such as drug rings and community groups. Finally, I argue that given its presence in the social, economic and political crevices of cities, violence itself is an underlying part of the relationship between cities and development. I suggest that by acknowledging this, it may be possible for the development initiatives shaping cities to more effectively address the needs of their citizens (Pavoni and Tulumello, 2018, 2).
The preeminence of physical violence in the global south can tell us a lot about the disparity that currently defines the relationship between cities and development. Indeed scholars such as Franz Vanderschueren have made a direct link between the presence of violence and unequal development, stating that ‘[v]iolence is not a spontaneous phenomenon but, above all, the product of a society characterized by inequality and social exclusion’ (Vanderschueren, 1996, 93). Addressing gang culture amongst a community of Puerto Ricans in New York for example, Gareth Jones and Dennis Rodgers, state that violence is pursued as a means of providing employment opportunities in the face of limited possibilities of work (Jones & Rodgers, 2015, 16). Loic Wacquant makes similar comparisons with Sao Paulo in Brazil, arguing that it is ‘chronic unemployment’ and ‘the absence of any social safety net’ that are the main reasons people resort to working in a drug economy that ‘feeds violence’ (Wacquant, 2003, 201). What the existence of violence highlights in these instances is that the current manner in which cities are being developed, can be determined by their failure to provide social and economic support for all their inhabitants. In this respect, it is not only the existence of physical violence that reflects the inequality that defines the relationship between cities and development, but also the presence of ‘structural violence’ (Moncada, 2013, 219). Defined as violence which causes physical and psychological harm through social and economic deprivation, the structural violence apparent here, reinforces the notion that the relationship between cities and development is one based on inequality (Moser & McIIwaine, 2014, 334).
As violence indicates that the development of cities is uneven, then as Jones and Rodgers advocate, it is important to ask ‘for whom development […] take[s] place and at whose expense’ (Jones & Rodgers, 2015, 3). By extending the definition of violence to include not just physical force but also the impact actions of deprivation have on communities spatially, violence can also teach us about who development does serve. Through evaluating ‘infrastructural violence’, for instance, it becomes clear who gains, and who loses (Jones & Rodgers, 2015, 16). ‘Infrastructural violence’ is the violence inflicted by physical spaces which exclude unwanted sections of society (Jones & Rodgers, 2015, 18). Rodgers highlights one such case of ‘infrastructural violence’ in Managua in which a ‘fortified network’ of roads has been built across the city to interconnect the spaces of ‘the Mangua elite’ (Rodgers, 2007, 71). The problem with these roads is that while for the elite they may prevent them from instances such as carjacking, and allow them quick and easy access through the city, they simultaneously isolate the poorer people in Managua (Rodgers, 2007, 71). As Rodgers highlights, this is achieved through ‘private security’, which cuts off poorer groups from certain areas in the city and concentrates them in impoverished areas where, rather than having a route out of their difficult situations, they are forced to turn to violence (Jones & Rodgers, 2015, 18). What this instance of ‘infrastructural violence’ illustrates, is that cities are increasingly being developed in a way that only suits the wealthier sections of society. As Rodgers highlights, the result is that cityscapes, and the development processes that create them, are increasingly being determined by whether or not they are suitable for ‘the exclusive use of the city elites’ (Rodgers, 2007, 72).
Various scholars have argued that ‘infrastructural violence’ has become so prominent because of a perceived threat of physical violence which has laid the groundwork for an ‘architecture of fear’ (Lemanski, 2004, 102). As Charlotte Lemanski has shown in the case of Cape Town, ‘high walls’, ‘gated communities’ and ‘electrified fences’ are increasingly being built by wealthy Capetonianas in order to cut themselves off from those they deem to be threatening (Lemanski, 2004, 106). Yet the irony, she remarks, is that it is actually those who cannot afford to protect themselves that are most at threat from the physical violence that takes place within the city. As she notes, ‘apartheid’s social-spatial legacy ensures that crime remains concentrated in poor black social groups and spaces’ (Lemanski, 2004, 104). One of the consequences of this fear of ‘phantom’ violence is the increasing involvement of the private sector in providing the security to tackle it (Pansters & Berthier, 2007, 36). Indeed, as states often lack the economic capacity to provide the protection desired by the elite, the private sector is carving out a role for itself in securitisation projects across cities (Lemanski, 2004, 102). The major impact of this, as Jones and Rodgers have drawn attention to, is that measures to tackle violence, are becoming more about the accumulation of capital than improving the social and economic circumstances that may incite it in the first place (Jones & Rodgers, 2015, 6). In Brazil, for instance, an ‘Urban Pacification Programme’ (UPP) was implemented in Rio with the apparent aim of decreasing violence to allow for social and economic development in the favelas (Jones & Rodgers, 2015, 9). Yet, Jones and Rodgers, note that one of the first things enacted by the UPP was the eradication of ‘illegal utility hook-ups’ (Jones & Rodgers, 2015, 9). Uncoincidentally, they remark, this allowed space for ‘banks and credit providers, chain stores, telephone and entertainment […] companies’ to swarm in and recruit the business of the favelas’ residents (Jones & Rodgers, 2015, 9). What this project reveals is that capital based incentives are increasingly driving development projects within cities, and it is under the guise of protection, that they can be concealed. The presence of violence then, real or imagined, can highlight the growing encroachment of the private sector into the relationship between cities and development.
One of the main factors that has enabled the private sector to nestle itself into development projects, particularly in the wake of neoliberalism, has been the ‘failings of […] state[s]’ to provide their citizens with protection, social security and employment (Meth, 2010, 256). It is these same failings which have left a ‘power vacuum’ that has been occupied by a host of other informal actors such as drug rings and community groups (Winton, 2004, 169). By looking at the violence inherent to these groups, it is possible to gain insight into another fundamental force that is shaping residents experience of cities. In Durban for instance, Paula Meth highlights the emergence of community ‘vigilante groups’ who, deeming the state incapable of ‘adminster[ing] justice and manag[ing] crime’, have created their own policing system using violence to punish local criminals (Meth, 2010, 257). Given as Meth states, that ‘levels of crime, violence, rape and murder […] are a very real problem for most South Africans’, the solution provided by these vigilante groups, although violent, arguably addresses Durban’s citizens’ needs to feel safe while moving about their daily lives (Meth, 2010, 254). Elsewhere in Brazil, the existence of violence also points towards state failures and the role of informal actors in providing community development. As Ailsa Winton has drawn attention to, it is increasingly those involved in the ‘drug trade’ that provide the residents of favelas with basic services (Winton, 2004, 170). She states that in the absence of the state, drug groups can ensure the ‘anonymity and freedom [needed] to conduct their business’ by providing their communities with services such as ‘internal security […] money to pay for medical treatment, soup kitchens and day-care centres’ (Winton, 2004, 171). In this respect, the violence carried out by drug groups in Rio, can also act as an indicator of the dependency of the residents of favelas on them for their basic needs. In Durban and Rio, violence reflects not only the gradual disappearance of the state in providing its citizens with safety and social services, but also the increasingly prominent role of informal actors taking their place.
What the above points illustrate is that violence, be it physical, structural or infrastructural, is a prevalent feature of urban environments. Yet, as Andrea Pavoni and Simone Tulumello have drawn attention to, many international bodies, governments and scholars strive towards cities ‘without violence’ (Pavoni and Tulumello, 2018, 2). As Sobia Ahmad Kaker echoes, international organisations promote the idea that ‘good governance’ involves the active attempt to eradicate violence from cities (Kaker, 2014, 95). Yet, if as we have seen that violence is evident in the social and economic structure of cities, the means in which services are provided and in their physicality, perhaps as Pavoni and Tulumello advocate, it should be seen ‘as an inevitable (if problematic) component of urban life’ (Pavoni and Tulumello, 2018, 16). Indeed, by recognising violence as part of the relationship between cities and development, it may be that it becomes easier to deal with. As Moser and McIIwaine argue, ‘interventions to reduce urban violence and conflict may realistically involve their management rather than their eradication’ (Moser & McIIwaine, 2014, 341). In the case of gangs for instance, they argue that by acknowledging the economic function they play in cities, rather than seeing them as something to be diminished, it becomes possible to work with them to address how violence may be reduced (Moser & McIIwaine, 2014, 340). In the case of Glasgow in the 1920s and 1930s for instance, Jones and Rodgers highlight that when conciliation with gangs was achieved, it was due to engaging with, not battling against them (Jones & Rodgers, 2015, 19). Moser and McIIwaine have suggested similar approaches to gender based violence. They argue that accepting its existence may allow for more suitable ways of addressing it. In Mumbai for instance, where public toilets have been directly linked to numerous cases of ‘assault’ and ‘rape’, engaging with citizens on what makes them dangerous could help prevent this (Belur et al, 2016, 63). However, as Jyoti Belur has argued ‘there is a lack of research on specific urban planning features such as approach roads, adequate lighting, and access to and use of public toilets’, which women have cited as key factors in their experiences of abuse (Belur et al, 2016, 63). This could be attributed to the current approach international organisations and governments take towards violence. Indeed, given that they are so intent on the creation of ‘safe’ cities, based on the removal of violence, current ways of curtailing it do not meet the needs of those most affected by it (Moser & McIIwaine, 2014, 333). As such, in line with scholars such as Pavoni and Tulumello, I argue that recognising the existence of violence as a feature of the relationship between cities and development, is ‘a necessary step’ if development initiatives are to work for all its city’s inhabitants (Pavoni, 2018, 16).
In this essay I have argued that the existence of violence within urban areas in the global south can provide particular insight into the workings of the relationship between cities and development. Firstly, I suggested that, given that physical violence can be attributed to social and economic inequality, its prominence in the global south reflects a development process that is marked by the exclusion of its poorer inhabitants. Consequently, I argued that this exposes that the current relationship between cities and development only works for certain sections of society. I illustrated this through instances of ‘infrastructural violence’ which display how cityscapes have been developed not for those most in need, but in a way that panders to elite fears of violence. By looking at how the private sector has both capitulated and aided these fears of violence, I argued that analysing it uncovers the increasing encroachment of the private sector on development initiatives in the global south. As the growing influence of the private sector entails the recoiling of the state, I suggested that various informal actors have also filled this void. I believe that their part in providing services to communities in cities in the global south can be seen through the violence which enables them to do so. My argument is thus that violence is visible in numerous aspects of the development processes within cities: in its built environment, in its social relationships and its economic hierarchies. As such, I have argued that the presence of violence also indicates the prominent place it has in the relationship between cities and their development. Thus, ultimately, I believe that in order for this relationship to become one which works for everyone, it must be acknowledged as such.
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